The Drug Overdose Epidemic: Deaths of Despair or Deaths of Addiction? by Botelho, Marissa et al.
The Drug Overdose Epidemic: Deaths of Despair or Deaths of Addiction? 1
The Drug Overdose Epidemic: 
Deaths of Despair or Deaths of Addiction?
By 
Marissa Botelho, Jennifer Lemos, Jessica Souza and Roger Clark
Rhode Island College
INTRODUCTION
The drug overdose epidemic in the United States has 
been, and continues to be, a scourge upon the land.  In 
2016, for which data were beginning to come in at this 
writing, approximately 62,000 Americans died from 
overdoses, about a 19 percent increase over 2015 (Katz 
2017). This number outstrips that of American lives 
lost to automobile accidents, gun shots and suicides 
(Economist 2017a). The drug overdose epidemic has 
become increasingly visible.  One Ohio coroner’s office 
in 2016, for example, stored dead opioid victims in 
refrigerated trucks outside its office because the bodies 
were pouring in faster than they could be processed 
(Economist 2017b).  Quinones (2017) reports that “drug 
overdosing” is currently the number one killer of people 
under 50 in the United States.
Drug overdose deaths, along with alcohol-related 
deaths and suicides, are increasingly known as “deaths 
of despair,” and are attributed to a reversal in what 
some imagined to be irreversible; that is, the mortality 
and morbidity rates for middle-aged white men and 
women (Case and Deaton 2015). In recent years 
the life expectancy for this social category has been 
decreasing, not increasing, as it continues to be for 
all others in the U. S. and the Western world. Monnat 
(2016) found a strong correlation between counties that 
voted for Donald Trump and ones that had high drug, 
alcohol and suicide mortality rates and concluded that 
this signaled that Trump voters often suffered from 
hopelessness and despair.  Further contributing to the 
notion that drug overdose deaths are rooted in despair 
is convincing research suggesting that such deaths may 
often be misclassified suicides (e.g., Rockett et al. 2014). 
Suicides, most assume, are a sign of hopelessness and, if 
overdose deaths are really hidden suicides, the thinking 
goes, such deaths are also a sign of hopelessness.
Our investigation, largely driven by our belief that 
drug overdose deaths can be reasonably investigated as a 
manifestation of a particular kind of cultural lag, began 
with the expectation that we would uncover evidence 
that drug overdose deaths are in fact deaths of despair. 
We found such evidence, but also found evidence, 
perhaps even stronger, for another perspective: that 
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these deaths have become more about markets for 
heroin and, perhaps, fentanyl-- a narcotic, analgesic, 
and sedative. We will first consider the case that the 
overdose epidemic is an instance of cultural lag.
The Overdose Epidemic as an Instance of Cultural 
Lag
William Ogburn’s (1922) concept of cultural lag 
refers to the social problems that can occur as the 
nonmaterial culture of a society (e.g., beliefs, values, 
perspectives) adapts to economic or technological 
changes.  The implicit period of delayed adjustment can 
generate serious hardships for a population.
  
In the case of the drug overdose epidemic, there 
have been at least two changes in the material culture 
(e.g., everything tangible that society produces, such as 
tools, inventions, artifacts ) that have been viewed as 
appropriate suspects.  One change, the massive upheaval 
in U.S. manufacturing and job loss, brought about by 
automation and relocation over the past five decades, 
has been associated with the demand for opiates. Parts 
of the U.S. have suffered selective economic declines 
that have led to downward mobility for many people. 
This increased economic vulnerability, augmented 
by the Great Recession of the last decade, has raised 
fears and anxieties that have, in turn, led many to drown 
and/or drug their sorrows, and sometimes to take their 
lives. Monnat (2016) demonstrates that the most 
economically distressed counties in the U.S. are also 
the ones that have the highest rates of drug, alcohol and 
suicide mortality.
In the middle 1990s, a second kind of material 
change took place: the development of prescription 
drugs that promised the delivery of “safe,” presumably 
non-addictive, opioid products for pain relief. This 
change increased dramatically the supply of opioids in 
the American marketplace. Until then, doctors largely 
prescribed opioids only for patients suffering from 
acute pain or terminal conditions. 
 
Perhaps the major “breakthrough” was Purdue 
Pharma’s discovery and marketing, in 1996, of 
Oxycontin. Oxycontin, a time-released formula 
for large, and varying, dosages of oxycodone, was 
designed for people suffering from chronic pain. This 
drug gained FDA approval for this purpose and was 
energetically marketed by Purdue, which employed 
a sales force that used practices that, some (e.g., Van 
Zee 2009; Quinones 2015) say, were often unethical 
and sometimes illegal. To suggest, as we do, that the 
development of a product (in this case Oxycontin) was 
responsible for the increased supply of legal opioids 
is not to ignore the importance of changing attitudes 
towards opioids in the medical community, attitudes that 
as early as the 1980s had begun to doubt the thinking 
that opioids were highly addictive and generally to be 
avoided (e.g., Quinones 2015: 15ff). The widespread 
sale and use of drugs like Oxycontin would have been 
impossible if a context of relatively relaxed attitudes 
towards the addictive potential of opioids had not 
emerged in the medical community.
Two Perspectives on the Drug Death Epidemic
We have found two major perspectives accounting 
for the drug death epidemic: a “deaths of despair” 
perspective and a “heroin market” perspective. Both 
perspectives are of recent origin.  The first perspective, 
associated with Anne Case and Angus Deaton1 (e.g., 
Case and Deaton 2017; Case and Deaton 2015a; Case 
and Deaton 2015b) argues that a loss of a sense of 
wellbeing within a significant swath of the American 
population is primarily responsible for its having 
turned to highly addictive drugs, alcohol and suicide. In 
its most recent and comprehensive formulation (Case 
and Deaton 2017), the “deaths of despair” lens suggests 
that a cumulative disadvantage has occurred, most 
remarkably for whites with lower education. Unlike 
hypotheses that have located the mortality problem in 
stagnant and declining incomes (e.g., Stiglitz 2015), 
hypotheses that Case and Deaton claim cannot account 
for why less-educated whites should have poorer 
mortality outcomes than, for example, less-educated 
members of minority groups, the “deaths of despair” 
perspective traces health and mortality declines to the 
progressively worsening labor market opportunities 
of less-educated whites and various correlates of this 
worsening.
The steady decline in job opportunities for whites 
with lower education levels has not only had enormous 
effects on their marriage and divorce prospects (Cherlin 
2009; Kenschaft, Clark and Ciambrone 2016), but also 
1Case and Deaton are affiliated with Princeton University’s Center 
for Health and Wellbeing.
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on the life chances of their children (Murray 2012; 
Putnam 2015).  Members of this social category have 
become much less likely to marry, much more likely to 
divorce when they do marry, much more likely to have 
children out of wedlock, much more likely to expose 
their children to unstable family lives, and much less 
likely to enable those children to attain good educations 
than did less educated whites in the past. Moreover, 
Case and Deaton (2017:33) point out that “half of the 
men who are out of the labor force are taking pain 
medication, and two thirds of those take prescription 
painkiller, such as opioids.” Case and Deaton concluded 
that reversing the trend towards deaths of despair 
cannot be done with purely economic solutions, at least 
not through short-term economic solutions. What is 
necessary is a program that addresses the family issues, 
the lack of spiritual fulfillment, “perceived meaning 
and satisfaction” (Case and Deaton 2017: 34) that lead 
to despair.  As Case and Deaton note, this prescription 
is not a particularly encouraging one. 
 
In this paper we focus exclusively on drug overdose 
deaths rather than combining them with alcohol-related 
deaths and suicides. We also use state-level data. One 
of the hypotheses we examine emerges directly from 
this “deaths of despair” perspective, namely:
Hypothesis 1: States with populations reporting high 
levels of overall wellbeing will have lower drug overdose 
death rates than states with populations reporting low levels 
of overall wellbeing.
We examined variables that, while not being proofs 
against despair, had been suggested to be inhibitors 
of despair. Religiosity is one factor that kept coming 
up in our examination of the literature on suicide and 
alcoholism, drug use, and even despair itself. Thus, 
for example, in a large number of articles published 
between 1980 and 2008, Gearing and Lizardi (2009) 
found epidemiological support for the protective effects 
of religious commitment, a protection that existed across 
Christian, Jewish, Muslim and Hindu communities. 
Similarly, in another review article, Haber et al. (2011) 
found a consistent inverse relationship between 
alcoholism and religion or spirituality. Kendler  Gardner, 
and Prescott (1997) and Binswanger et al. (2012) 
have found evidence, in disparate populations, that 
religiosity can be a protective factor against drug use 
and overdosing. Other studies (e.g., McClain et al. 
2003) have even found evidence that spiritual wellbeing 
can be a protection against despair in terminally ill 
cancer patients. The literature is not unequivocal, to be 
sure. In Dreamland, Quinones’ (2015) marvelous study 
of the opiate epidemic, he found that addiction spread 
particularly quickly within one church community. 
In general, though, the literature led us to our 
second hypothesis we propose related to the “death of 
despair.” 
Hypothesis 2:  States with high percentages of their 
populations saying they are not religious will have 
higher drug overdose death rates than other states. 
If  the “death of despair” perspective on drug overdose 
deaths has a short pedigree, the “heroin market” 
perspective, as far as we can tell, has an even shorter one. 
We first saw it articulated in a short Economist article 
on May 11th, 2017 (Economist 2017c). This perspective 
argues that the long-term trend in drug deaths may not 
only have much to do with working-class despair, but 
also that its recent, life-defying rise has even more to do 
with access to heroin markets.  
Until about 2010, the increase in opioid deaths was 
highly related to prescription drugs, like Oxycontin.  In 
the past few years, heroin and potent synthetic drugs, 
like fentanyl, have become more significant, even 
though most users of the latter two drugs were formerly 
abusers of the former. 
 
Drug abusers often make the switch from prescription 
drugs to heroin and synthetic drugs because the latter are 
cheaper and more potent.  There are actually two major 
kinds of heroin on the U. S. market currently and only 
one of these, a white-powder heroin from Colombia, 
looks and acts sufficiently like crushed pain pills that 
it has made the switch an easy one for prescription-
drug addicts. Once this switch is made, fentanyl, or 
some other synthetic drug, often comes into the mix. 
According to the Economist (2017c), a Mexican brown-
powder or black-tar heroin, which figures much more 
prominently in Quinones’s (2015) story and is more 
characteristically found west of the Mississippi, has 
“probably deterred many painkiller addicts from trying 
the drug (i.e., heroin), and has kept synthetic opioids at 
bay” according to the Economist (2017c).  
While neither the Economist nor its primary data 
source, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), provide 
us with a way of determining precisely which states are 
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most involved in the white-powder heroin market, the 
CDC has recently begun to provide data on how many 
of the drug overdose deaths in a state can be attributed 
to heroin. These data are only available, however, for the 
28 states for which the CDC finds the heroin overdose 
death data “good” quality or better.  
 As a first approximation of the market for 
white-powder heroin in a state, we use statewide 
heroin overdose death rates to test the heroin market 
perspective:
Hypothesis 3: States with higher heroin overdose death 
rates will have higher overall drug overdose rates than states 
with lower heroin overdose death rates.
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH and MAJOR 
VARIABLES
Data Sources and Limitations
The tests of our hypotheses are based on data available 
to researchers for secondary analysis. Specifically, we 
used data from the Kaiser Family Foundation (2017a) 
and from Gallup’s (2017) “State of the States.” Data for 
this project were not always easy to locate. We were 
limited by budget to materials available online, but we 
have located data sources that researchers with deeper 
pockets or more prestigious institutional affiliations 
may also want to explore. 
 
Because of budget and data limitations, we had to 
make some methodological compromises. For example, 
when we tried to measure heroin markets, we ran into 
our most severe data barriers. Not surprisingly, there are 
no good state-level data on the kinds of heroin available 
in illegal heroin markets. Therefore, we decided that a 
decent, but imperfect, substitute measure is the heroin 
overdose death rate by state.2   But certain bits of critical 
2We used this measure, aware of the limitation that it is a 
constituent of our dependent variable, the overall overdose death 
rate by state, and therefore likely to be more highly correlated with 
it than other possible measures, the likeliest, perhaps, being the 
drug arrest rate by state. Unfortunately, alternate measures like 
crime rates, including the drug arrest rate, vary with many things 
other than heroin usage (including the usage of other drugs and the 
highly variable inclinations of state law enforcement authorities 
to criminalize drug usage). Therefore, we view crime rates as an 
even more imperfect measure of heroin markets than the heroin 
overdose death rate. Moreover, we have determined that not all 
constituents of the overall drug overdose death rate are strongly 
information are, to the best of our knowledge, simply 
untapped as of now. 
 
Major Variables and Statistical Analysis
Our dependent variable is the overall drug overdose 
death rate per 100,000 (age-adjusted) in 2013 and 2015 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2017a). The three major 
independent variables in our analysis are measures of 
a state’s population’s overall wellbeing, its religiosity 
and its heroin markets. For the first two independent 
variables we use data provided by Gallup’s (2017) 
“State of the States” for 2016. These data summarize 
daily polls taken throughout the year to provide overall 
measures on many state (and city and individual) 
characteristics. Our measure of states’ overall wellbeing 
is Gallup’s Overall Well-Being Index in 2016, a measure 
that is a composite indicator of people’s sense of 
purpose, their social and financial wellbeing, their 
sense of community and physical health.3  
Our measure of religiosity is the percentage of a 
state’s residents who say religion is not important in 
their lives and that they seldom or never attend religious 
services. A high score on this measure is interpreted, 
for this study, as a low score on religiosity. We used 
Gallup (2017) for our 2016 measure and found an 
earlier Gallup measure of the same variable in 2011 
from Hicken (2012).
With no more than 50, and sometimes as few as 
28, states as units of analysis, there are relatively few 
degrees of freedom to conduct simple linear multiple 
regression analyses, especially given the relatively 
large number of independent variables we are initially 
interested in. Therefore, we employ forward stepwise 
regression analyses via the Statistical Package of 
correlated. Thus, for instance, the methadone overdose death rate 
is correlated with the heroin overdose death rate at a weak .11 
level.  In the absence of a better measure of the extent to which 
heroin markets thrive in states, then, and with genuine concern 
about the appropriateness of our measure, we proceeded.
3We spoke with a Gallup representative about obtaining measures 
of overall wellbeing for earlier years, but found the costs to do so 
were beyond our (and our College’s) means. The closest we were 
able to come to an earlier measure was not the actual index in an 
earlier year but a ranking of states by overall wellbeing in 2012 
(Gallup-Heathways 2012). We have used these data in our panel 
regression analysis reported later in this paper.  
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the Social Sciences (SPSS). We use the variables we 
speculated might be related to the drug overdose death 
rate and select variables that create an economical 
model.  Specifically, we instructed SPSS to add the most 
significant variable at each step of its processing until 
all variables not in the selected model have p values 
that are greater than .05.  
The forward stepwise regression analysis enables a 
cross-sectional examination of the variables that have 
the greatest controlled association with our dependent 
variable, drug overdose death rates. But both the 
“despair” and the “markets” perspective focus on change 
in drug overdose death rates. Consequently, another 
statistical tool we use here is panel regression analysis. 
Panel regression analysis permits the evaluation of the 
impact of several independent variables on change in 
a dependent variable by regressing the latter on itself 
(in 2015) and the independent variables at an earlier 
time (in 2013). This statistical tool usually yields a 
conservative test because the lagged dependent variable 
is normally extremely highly correlated with itself at 
the earlier time (cf. Hannan 1979). This is especially 
likely to be the case with short time lags, such as the 
one used in this analysis (two years).
Based on the Economist’s (2107c) analysis, we 
assumed that states with higher heroin death rates 
are ones in which a white-powder heroin market is 
dominant, since it is in these states that prescription 
drug addicts will have most likely switched over to 
heroin. Since the CDC (2017) has determined that 
heroin deaths are sufficiently accurate in 28 states, 
those are the states for which published data on heroin 
death rates were available in 2014 and 2015. We use 
these data in both a cross-sectional stepwise regression 
analysis and our panel regression analysis.
We entered nine other variables into our cross-
sectional analyses, anticipating that some of these 
might supersede our main independent variables 
as predictors of drug overdose deaths rates. The 
conventional view that economic deprivation leads 
to drug misuse (e.g., Stiglitz 2015) led us to several 
possibilities. We expected, for example that states 
with higher unemployment rates would have higher 
drug overdose death rates than others and so entered 
a measure of unemployment rates in 2015 (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2017). We expected that states with 
higher poverty rates would experience higher overdose 
death rates than others and so entered poverty rates for 
2015 (Bishaw and Glassman 2016). We thought that 
better educated populations would have lower overdose 
death rates than others and entered the percentage of 
the state population with a high school diploma or 
higher (Wikipedia 2017, based on U.S. Census data). 
We also expected states with older populations, which 
are more likely to receive legal opioid prescriptions 
for pain, to have higher drug overdose death rates than 
others and entered a measure of median age in 2014 
(Murphy 2015). Along these same lines, we felt the 
drug overdose death rates might directly vary with the 
prescription rates of legal opioid painkillers and so 
entered a measure of this in 2012, the date for which 
we could find such an indicator (Paulozzi et al. 2014). 
The literature led us to expect that drug overdose deaths 
might be concentrated in states with predominantly 
white populations and, in any case, wanted to enter a 
variable measuring race, so use data on the percentage 
of a state’s population that was white in 2015 (Kaiser 
Family Foundation 2017b). We thought it possible 
that two kinds of populations might be more likely to 
have strong norms against drug use: people identifying 
as Republicans and those who are very religious, and 
so we entered measures of each, again using Gallup 
data (Gallup 2017). We also speculated that marijuana 
might be a gateway drug to drug overdose deaths and 
so entered a measure of statewide marijuana use, based 
the National Survey on Drug Use and Health in 2014 
(Hughes et al. 2016).
Results
We first performed a cross-sectional analysis 
involving the drug overdose death rate as the dependent 
variable and 11 independent or predictor variables.4 
These 11 predictors were: the unemployment rate in 
2015, the percentage of the population claiming to be 
nonreligious in 2016, the proportion of the population 
with a high school certificate or more of formal 
education, the prescription rate of legal opioids in 
2012, the percentage of the population that was white 
in 2015, the poverty rate in 2015, the median age of the 
population in 2015, the percentage of the population 
with a Republican party affiliation in 2016, the 
percentage of the population claiming to be religious in 
4We did not include heroin overdose death rates, which are only 
available for 28 states and which the CDC suggests may not be 
reliable enough for cross-state comparisons.
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2016, the Gallup index measuring the level of well being 
experienced by the population in 2016, and marijuana 
use in 2014.
Table 1 shows that the forward stepwise regression 
found that two of these variables constituted an 
economical model: the index of overall wellbeing in 
2016, with a beta of -.75 in the final model, and the 
percent of the population claiming to be nonreligious in 
2016, with a beta of .51 in the final model.  This finding 
would appear to support the perspective that drug 
overdose deaths are substantially a result of despair. 
States with higher well-being indices have lower 
drug overdose death rates than others and states with 
higher percentages of their populations claiming to 
be nonreligious (or lacking a major protection against 
despair) have higher death rates than others. (See Table 
1.)
   
Table 1.  Final Model Produced by Forward 
Stepwise Regression of the Drug Overdose Death 
Rate by State on Eleven Independent Variables 
without a Measure of Heroin-Related Death Rates
          Betas
Overall Well-Being Index, 2016             -.75***
Percentage of Population Claiming to
Be Nonreligious, 2016     .51***
N        50
Adjusted R-square    .42
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at the .001 level.
However, the problem with this analysis, as proponents 
of the “market” perspective on drug overdose deaths 
suggest, is that it does not take into account the effect 
of the market for heroin in states.  We have tried to take 
an accounting of its effect by measuring the market 
in terms of the heroin death rate in states, despite the 
reservations we have for using this measure. Among 
these reservations are that “good” to “excellent” data 
about heroin deaths rates are only available for 28 states 
and, even for these, the Centers for Disease Control 
advise that they not be used for comparisons among 
states (CDC, 2017). But, we reasoned, if the heroin 
death rates are so incomparable, they would provide a 
relatively conservative test of the “market” perspective, 
even if heroin death rates are not the ideal measure 
of the degree to which states are involved in heroin 
markets. Their incomparability might lead us to expect 
a lower correlation with overall drug overdose death 
rates than we would obtain with more comparable data. 
(See Table 2.)
Table 2.  Final Model Produced by Forward 
Stepwise Regression of Drug Overdose Death 
Rate by State on Thirteen Independent Variables, 
including Heroin-Induced Death Rates
         Betas
Heroin-Induced Death Rates           .67***
Opioid Prescription Rates, 2012             .33**
N                28
Adjusted R-square            .52
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at the .001 level.
Still, Table 2 must be interpreted with caution.  The 
data in Table 2 suggest that, when a measure of heroin 
deaths is introduced, only it (beta =.67) and the legal 
opioid prescription rate (beta = .33) appear in a model. 
Moreover, this model explains about 10 percent more 
variation (adjusted R-square = .52) in drug overdose 
death rates for the 28 states involved than did the model 
in Table 1 (adjusted R-square =. 42) for 50 states.  We 
thus, cautiously, infer that, in cross-sectional models at 
least, there appears to be greater support for the “market” 
than the “despair” perspective on drug overdose deaths.
 
Unfortunately, cross-sectional analyses such the 
ones presented in Tables 1 and 2 cannot sort out time-
sequencing and one is left with the questions: which 
comes first, the despair, the market for heroin, or the 
drug deaths?  Also, would the relatively strong support 
for the heroin “market” perspective persist if we focused 
on changes in the drug overdose death rate rather than 
simply levels of that rate?  Both questions led us to 
employ panel regression, a technique that requires early 
and late measures of the dependent variable as well as 
measures of the independent variables of interest at 
approximately the same time as the early measure of the 
dependent variable. 
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The “lag” in our panel regression analyses is limited by 
the data we’ve been able to find online.  But, in general, 
those analyses again tend to support the “market” 
perspective.  Thus, when we examined what may have 
affected the change in the drug overdose death rate in the 
period between 2013 and 2015 (the period for which we 
can find online reasonably-appropriate measures of our 
key independent variables), we find stronger controlled 
relations between early measures of the heroin death 
rate and change in drug overdose death rates than we 
do early measures of either of our of statewide despair 
measures. Table 3 boils down these findings and shows, 
as one would expect, that the strongest predictor in 
our model of 2015 drug overdose deaths rate in the 28 
states involved was drug overdose death rates in 2013 
(beta = .50).  A close second was heroin overdose death 
rates in 2014 (beta = .49), followed by the legal opioid 
prescription rates in 2012 (beta = .36).  Neither of our 
measures of despair or a potential for despair—e.g., 
the ranking of states by levels of overall well being in 
2012 (beta = -.18) and the percentage of the population 
claiming to be nonreligious in 2011 (beta = .13), was 
statistically significantly related to drug overdose deaths 
in 2015 when the other variables were controlled, even 
though both variables were related in the predicted 
direction to the dependent variable. (See Table 3.)
Table 3.  Panel Regression Analysis of Drug 
Overdose Death Rate in 2015 on Itself in 2013 and 
the Heroin Overdose Death Rate in 2014, Opioid 
Prescription Rate in 2012, the Ranking of States 
by Levels of Overall Well Being in 2012, and the 
Percentage of Those Claiming to be Nonreligious 
2011
         Betas
Drug Overdose Death Rate 2013  .50***
Heroin Overdose Death Rate 2014  .49***
Legal Opioid Prescription Rate 2012     .36*
Ranking by Overall Well Being 2012              -.18
Percent Nonreligious 2011   .13
N       28
Adjusted R-square    .81
Notes: * indicates significance at the .05 level; ***, at the .001 level.
DISCUSSION
We find support for both the “deaths of despair” 
and the “heroin market” perspectives, although the 
support for the latter appears to be stronger than that 
for the former.  In a cross-sectional analysis involving 
all 50 states, without a measure of heroin markets only 
available for 28 states, stepwise regression picked our two 
“despair” indicators, overall wellbeing and the absence 
of religiosity, out of a lineup involving 11 variables. 
But when we introduced heroin death rates into an 
analysis involving only 28 states, it and our indicator of 
the legal opioid prescription rate (in 2012) pushed the 
despair indicators out of the picture.  Moreover, in our 
panel analysis involving the four dependent variables of 
interest—the two despair variables, the heroin market 
variable and the opioid prescription rate variables—
only the latter two had significant associations with 
drug overdose death rates in 2015, when drug overdose 
deaths rates in 2013 were controlled. Neither of our 
perspectives, by the way, had predicted that the legal 
opioid prescription rate would still have the significant 
impact it appears to have on drug overdose deaths 
in America. That it does is certainly worthy of policy 
consideration (see below).
We have hinted at the caution with which we report 
these results. Much of the caution has to do with data 
limitations, although some of it has to do with more 
theoretical concerns. We are pleased enough with our 
despair measures for the cross-sectional analyses, but 
neither is easily or cheaply available for the proper 
year (2013) of the panel analysis, and the wellbeing 
indicator, a ranking of indexes rather than the indexes 
themselves for that analysis, is suboptimal. Our measure 
of heroin markets is less than ideal for several reasons. 
Theoretically, we would much prefer some measure of 
the degree to which white-powder heroin dominates a 
state market for heroin. One can imagine polling being 
able to tap such a concept, in much the same way The 
Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality 
now polls for marijuana usage. But we’re not there yet. 
Our indicator, the heroin overdose death rate, entails 
many difficulties, not the least of which is its likely 
unreliability for years to come.  But even if it were 
perfectly reliable, it is obviously a sub-dimension of the 
overall drug overdose death rate and therefore more 
likely to be correlated with that rate than a measure with 
more obvious face validity.  Perhaps the most obvious 
problem, however, is the fact that the heroin death 
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rate is available for only 28, just over half of the states. 
One has to wonder what kinds of biases are involved in 
such a partial representation, but they surely include, 
to some degree, a variable concern for the growing 
heroin epidemic within the larger drug epidemic. At 
a more theoretical level, our results may be criticized 
for entanglement with the ecological fallacy.  Thus, for 
instance, just because states with high overall wellbeing 
indexes have relatively low drug overdose death rates 
does not mean that individuals with a sense of wellbeing 
are protected from overdosing.
Still, our results are suggestive, both theoretically 
and in terms of public policy.  At the theoretical level, 
they suggest that the transition from addiction to legal 
prescription painkillers to addiction to heroin and 
synthetic drugs like fentanyl may now be the main 
driver of rapidly increasing drug overdose deaths in 
the United States.  As a consequence, those concerned 
about the drug overdose epidemic may need to 
distinguish it, conceptually, from the somewhat clearer 
instance of deaths of despair, such as suicide.  It may be 
more useful to think of drug overdose deaths as deaths 
of addiction, addictions that may originally have had 
some foundation in despair, but that may also have 
had some foundation in chronic pain management or 
simple experimentation with opioids for pleasure.
Case and Deaton (2017) point out that dealing with 
overdose deaths as deaths of despair actually points to 
policies that are anything but simple to enact.  It would 
not only mean attempting to deal creatively with the 
economic changes that have led to widespread economic 
discomfort, but also with intervening conditions 
like later and more fragile marriages and an inability 
to provide supportive families for children. If one 
conceptualized the drug overdose epidemic in terms 
of deaths of addiction, however, the question becomes 
one of how to prevent addiction in the first place and 
how to make it more easily treated if it occurs.  States 
have begun to deal with both of these issues.  Thus, for 
instance, Florida (Johnson et al. 2014) and Kentucky 
(Chapman 2017) are among states that have begun to 
regulate pain clinics and doctors who have prescribed 
opioids. Various states and municipalities have begun 
to sue pharmaceutical companies to get them to change 
their advertising methods (e.g., Economist 2017b). 
Various jurisdictions have expanded access to Naloxone, 
a drug that treats overdoses, as well as to treatment and 
rehabilitation centers (e.g., Chapman 2017) and some 
public efforts have been made to reduce the stigma 
associated with addiction so that concerned friends and 
relatives are more inclined to help (Quinones 2015). 
 
On a less positive note, Medicaid expansion under 
the Affordable Care Act has accounted for roughly half 
of Medicaid expenditures on substance abuse treatment 
in many of the states with the greatest drug overdose 
death rates (Alonso-Zaldivar 2017). At this writing, 
these funds, utilized by low-income adults, are likely to 
be cut substantially under Republican healthcare plans.
What to do about the markets for white-powder 
heroin and synthetic opioids is harder to prescribe, 
but so far nothing seems to have worked.  Noting the 
markets for white-powder and black-tar heroin are 
largely separated by the Mississippi River, the Economist 
(2017c) recommends that “This is a rare case where one 
should pray that America stays divided.”  But prayer has 
its limits.  And efforts have been made to shut down 
dark net sources of synthetic drugs, even as these 
sources continue to pop up, like targets in a deadly 
game of whack-a-mole (Popper 2017).
   
Dealing effectively with the overdose drug epidemic 
will undoubtedly require efforts on many fronts.  But 
choosing the right fronts will increasingly depend on 
figuring out what they are.   Generating relevant data and 
making those data more readily available to researchers, 
however, are certainly going to be two of them.
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